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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature ofthe Case
Appeal from the district court's, (sitting in an appellate capacity), denial of
appellant's, (hereafter "Beck"), appeal from the magistrate court's decision denying
Beck's MOTION TO SUPPRESS evidence and admissions/confessions.
B. Procedural History
Beck was charged with possession of paraphernalia, pled "not guilty", jury trial was
set, a motion to suppress evidence and admissions/confessions was filed, Beck submitted
a memorandum and affidavit in support, a hearing was set, conducted, at which time the
motion was denied. The Magistrate then signed an ORDER prepared by the state with
two modifications. An Idaho Criminal Rule 11, (hereafter "ICR"), plea agreement
preserving the issue of the denial of the ICR 12(b) and an appeal were filed in the district
court, which upheld the magistrate's decision in a MEMORANDUM DECISION,
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ORDER AND APPELLATE JUDGMENT. A timely appeal was filed, this brief in
support follows.
Statement of Facts
The Beck and his girlfriend were sleeping in the Beck's tent which was located in the
Mack's Creek campground near Lucky Peak reservoir in Boise County, Idaho. The tent
was halfway falling down, and, "the door was wide open", (Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)
Hearing Transcript, (hereafter "Tr"), p 13,116-14). The tent was on a campsite
designated by the Army Corps of Engineers, (Tr p 21, 11 19-22). The campsite was
discemable from other campsites, (Tr p 22,115-10). A holey-burnt-residue laden can,
(hereafter "can"), with a plant stem was found outside of the tent, (Tr p 13, 1115-19). The
can was located within two feet of the entrance of the tent where Beck was sleeping, and
the officer walked within two feet said entrance and seized the can, (Tr p13, 1122-25, p
14, 11 3-6). The officer approached the tent, and walked "around the tent. And while
walking around the tent, I found a beer can next to the tent ... ", (Tr p 13,11 15-16). The
officer did not possess a search warrant at the time he entered the curtilage of the
campsite, (Tr p 20, 1122-24). The beer can was, "just left of the tent next to a tree.", (Tr p
13,1122-23). The officer then, "hollered in, woke up Mr. Beck's girlfriend, had her wake
him up, then had him come out and sit on a lawn chair ... ", (Tr 18, 11 7-10). When first
questioned, the defendant denied possession of the can, (Tr p 24, 11 8-13). The defendant
was not afforded his Miranda rights after denying possession of the can, was not
provided with an attorney, and was not informed by the officer that he was free to leave,
(Tr p 24,1111-24). After the initial denial, Beck denied possession of the can more than
once, (Tr p 24,1125, P 25, 111-7). After continued questioning, Beck made
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admissions/confessions concerning the can, (Tr p 25, 11 5-10). Beck's campsite was
located on the main trail that provided access to other campsites in the area, (Tr p 26, 11 820).

II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Were the Beck's 4th Amendment Rights violated by the warrantless entry into the
curtilage of his camp site?
2. Were Beck's 5th and 6th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination violated by the
unwarned and coercive questioning by law enforcement officers?
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Beck's 4th Amendment Rights were violated by the warrantless entry into the
curtilage of his camp site.

The area between the trail and Beck's tent was curtilage.
"In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134,94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), the
Supreme Court set forth four factors to be considered in determining whether an area
surrounding a home comes within the definition of curtilage for Fourth Amendment
purposes. These factors are: (1) the proximity to the home of the area claimed to
be curtilage; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident
to protect the area from the observation of people passing by. 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct.
at 1139-40. The Court stated that it was not creating a bright-line rule or "finely tuned
formula," but rather providing "useful analytical tools" with which to decide the central
question of whether the area "is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. l
Factors 1 and 2 are met as the tent was located dead center within the curtilage.
Factor 3, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, is satisfied in that the area
immediately surrounding a tent is used to get into and out one's home, store belongings
that will not fit inside the tent, and cook, (Tr p 59,

I

n 16-18).

State v Webb, 130 Idaho 462, (1997).
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Factor 4, steps taken by a

resident to protect the area from passersby militates for Beck in that the area where the
can was located was not in a direct line of sight by respectful citizens passing by on the
public trail. Office Urquhart established that the can was six to seven feet from the path,
and behind a tree next to the tent:

"Q Okay. And how close was the tree where you indicated the can was found to that
path, approximately?

A Approximately six to seven feet.

Q So someone could throw a can down there real easily?
A If they could curve it so it went around the tree and land between the Beck's tent and
the tree.", (Tr p 58,11 19-25).
Beck argues that if a can could not be thrown from the location on the trail and
land where the can was found by law enforcement without the ability to "curve it", then
the can could not be observed in that place either. Placing the can behind the tree where
it could not be observed by a respectful citizen on the trail fulfills the 4th requirement
under the Dunn, (supra), factors. The area where Beck's tent was pitched is a primitive
campground next to Lucky Peak reservoir. Inherent in areas next to reservoirs are rocks,
trees, bushes and elevation changes. Urquhart's testimony about "curve it" was
dispositive of the issue of where the can was located, and it was not in a position where
the officers outside of the curtilage could have seen it.
The officers were present at the defendant's tent/residence on a trail approximately
six or seven feet from his tent, which under the law, said tent is the same as his castle. 2

2 II Neither history nor this Nation's experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic. II Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, l387-88, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 660 (1980). The respect for the
sanctity of the home does not depend upon whether it is a mansion or hut, or whether it is a pennanent or a
temporary structure. As stated eloquently by William Pitt, II 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the stonn may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter- -all his force dares not cross
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The officers were there to speak with Beck about information they had received. The
officers could observe Beck sleeping in his tent from the vantage point on the trail as his
tent wall was collapsing. In order to retrieve a can that was found within a few feet of
Beck's tent, (MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER AND APPELLATE JUDGMENT,
(hereafter "MEMORANDUM DECISION"), pI), the officer had to intrude within a few
feet of where Beck was sleeping with his girlfriend. There was no reason for officers to
step onto the curtilage of the property. The following dialogue establishes the officers
were within the curtilage off of the public trail prior to observing the can:
Q. And you two officers were walking around the campsite and looking around
before you woke people up, correct?
A. That's correct.

Q. And they did not wake up at that point, correct?
A. When we were walking around and through-

Q. Correct?
A. The campsite? That's correct, (emphasis added, Tr p 59,114-11).
"Through" means within the curtilage and onto the protected area of the campsite.
Courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage, which is the area or
buildings immediately adjacent to a home which a reasonable person may expect to
remain private even though it is accessible to the public. State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267,
272, 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Ct.App.l992). However, the presence of a police officer within
the curtilage does not, by itself, result in an unconstitutional intrusion. State v. Clark, 124

the threshold of the ruined tenement!' " Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1195,2
L.Ed.2d 1332, 1337 (1958) (quoting remarks attributed to William Pitt).
A structure need not be one's "home" in order for the occupant to have a legitimate expectation of
privacy there. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687-88, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 92-93
(1990). "'[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' and provides sanctuary for citizens
wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.at 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. at 1688 n. 5, 109 L.Ed.2d
at 93 n. 5.
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Idaho 308, 313, 859 P .2d 344, 349 (Ct.App.1993). Just as there is an implied invitation
for citizens to access a house by using driveways or pathways to the entry, police with
legitimate business are entitled to enter areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to
public use. Id. A criminal investigation is as legitimate a societal purpose as any other
undertaking that would normally take a person to another's front door. Rigoulot, 123
Idaho at 272,846 P.2d at 923. Therefore, when the police come onto private property to
conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their
movements to places ordinary visitors could be expected to go, observations made from
such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Id.

The Court of Appeals held in State v. Reyna, 142 Idaho 624, 130 P.3d 1162 (Idaho
App. 2005), as follows:
"Furthermore, there is an implied invitation for the general public to use and enter access
routes to a house such as pathways, driveways, parking lots, and similar areas. State v.
Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126, 130 (Ct.App.2001). So long as the police
remain in a place where a reasonable citizen would be (e.g the driveway), their intrusion
is legal, even if the police are standing in the home curtilage without a warrant.
See id. We conclude that, for the purpose of an arrest warrant with limitations, such an
access-way would also be a "public place."
In this case, once again, there was no reason to step onto the Beck's property and
look around when their mission- waking the defendant up- could have been accomplished
from the public trail. If the officers were close enough to awaken Beck, then they were
close enough to discuss with Beck the purpose for their visit. In this case, the officers
were walking within the cmiilage in order to look for paraphernalia, which is illegal
without a search warrant. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9 th Cir. 1993), as follows:
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"The obvious implication of Dunn 3 is that observations made by officers while they
are not within the curtilage of a house do not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment ... Under Dunn ... it does not matter that the officers first trespass upon a
property that is obviously curtilage ... while investigating a tip, as long as the
incriminating observations take place outside the protected curtilage."
In State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 263 P.3d 145, @ 149, (Idaho App. 2011), the
court essentially defined how curtilage is defined by the type of structure when the 4th
amendment applies:
"Linenberger was using his boat as a residence at the time the detective knocked on
the door. Therefore, it is appropriate to analogize linenberger's boat to a home. Just as a
pathway to the entry of a home is considered curtilage and impliedly open to public use,
when the detective used the pathway to the door of Linenberger's boat to knock and
initiate contact as part of a criminal investigation, the detective did no more than enter
the curtilage of Linenberger's home, impliedly open to public use. Further, there must be
means by which police can knock on the door of a boat to initiate some sort of contact
with the occupants. Otherwise, the boat would unreasonably be rendered a police-free
zone. Accordingly, the district court was correct to conclude that, by doing no more than
walking to the front door of Linenberger's boat to knock, the detective did not make an
unconstitutional entry."
In the present case, a tent does not have pathway to the front door, there is no
doorbell to ring, and no door to knock on. The officers could complete their missionawakening and speaking with Beck, from their vantage point six to seven feet away on
the public trail remote from where Beck was sleeping with his girlfriend. There was no
reason for the officers to trespass into the curtilage in order to speak to Beck.

Linenberger is dispositive on this issue- entrance into the curtilage is defined by the
purpose for which law enforcement is intruding onto private property. The officers in
this case intruded for purposes of locating paraphernalia, not to awaken Beck.

3

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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This Court should also consider the unique features of living in a tent. The tent walls
are the only safeguard from the outside world. Since the tent is one's home, every phase
of living is done behind these walls, which could include eating, sleeping, matters of
personal hygiene, and sex.
Officer Urquhart's testimony clearly established that the can could not have been
observed without illegally entering onto the property. The location of the can was behind
a tree between the tree and Beck's tent, (Tr, p 58, 11 19-25), not visible from the public
trail where the officers had a right to be, (see argument supra).
B. Beck's 5th and 6th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination were violated by the

unwarned and coercive questioning by law enforcement officers.
The holding in Miranda v Arizona states that prior to any custodial interrogation
initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, that person must be afforded Miranda
warnings. The two issues in determining if a suspect's Miranda rights have been violated
are: if the suspect was in custody at the time of the questioning, and ifthe conduct by the
police constituted an interrogation.
CUSTODY
The court assesses Miranda type custody under a totality of the circumstances
approach viewed from the perspective of the reasonable person.
Beck was in custody from a reasonable person's standpoint. The officer
instructed Beck's girlfriend to wake him up, ordered Beck to sit in a lawn chair for
reasons of officer safety, and did not tell Beck he was free to leave, (Tr p 18, 11 5-11; P
27,1118-25, p 28, 111-6;). Further evidence of the coercive nature of this contact is
established by state's witness Alex Urquhart when he testified that Officer Jones
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"requested" that Beck sit in a lawn chair when Beck became belligerent, (Tr p 60, 11 1625, P 61, 111-5). Beck's affidavit further establishes that the contact with officers was
custodial from the inception: Beck was awakened while sleeping in his personal
residence 4 by uniformed, armed officers wearing badges, not afforded Miranda, did not
feel free to ignore the officer's questioning, and was arrested as a result of the contact
with officers, (Beck's affidavit submitted with the motion in magistrate's court, affirmed
under oath at the ICR 12(b) hearing, and subject to cross-examination, (Tr p 64, 11 7-25;
p 65,111-25; p 66,111-12), emphasis the author's). Beck argues that the Magistrate and
the District Judge ignored the affidavit. The affidavit standing alone is sufficient to
establish custody status, and Beck's testimony and the circumstances educed at the
hearing establish Miranda warnings should have been given at a minimum.

State v Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 651, holds:
"Not all contacts between policemen and citizens constitute
seizures of the individuals. A seizure occurs only when the
officer, through physical force or show of authority,
restrains an individual's liberty. The test to determine
whether someone is restrained is whether, considering all
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police
conduct would communicate to a reasonable person that he
or she is not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his or her business."
In this case, Beck was confronted with purported paraphernalia and questioned
about prior drug uses sans Miranda warnings after being ordered to sit in a chair. The

Personal residences are afforded the most protection under the 4th amendment and analogous provisions of
the Idaho constitution, (Article r, Section 17).
5 An officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to
the person being questioned, Stansbury v California,_U.S._,_(1994). Gutierrez was using information from the
defendant's sister and daughter to formulate questions during the interrogation. Gutierrez conveyed this
knowledge to the defendant numerous times by accusing her of lying, informing her he will tell the judge she is
lying, and informing her she will go to prison for her actions of the writing the checks, the very actions for
which he is questioning her.
4
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show of authority by armed/uniformed! badged police officers awakening and telling a
suspect to sit in a chair is- once again, from a reasonable person's standpoint, the
embodiment of custody and establishes that Beck was not free to ignore the officer's
questioning and orders and to go about his business.
INTERROGA nON
"Interrogation" is defined as words or conduct by police that are "reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the suspect. 6 The standard is predicated
upon the "perceptions of the suspect" but courts also consider the intent of the
"reasonable police officer". Interrogation clearly embraces express questioning, that is,
verbal statements by police to a suspect that are punctuated with question marks, (e.g.,
"What happened?"). But it also applies to any other verbal or nonverbal conduct that is
the "functional equivalent" of express questioning even though not presented in the
grammatical form of an interrogatory. 7
In Innis, (supra), the Court held, "[The] term "interrogation" under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of police
(other than normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect",
In this case, being confronted with the can and questioned about prior pot use, (Tr
p 11,1116-25; p 12,111-25; p 13,111-9), constitutes interrogation likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Beck was then questioned about the can the officer had found,
(Tr p 14,113- 19). In response to the questioning, Beck eventually admitted to smoking
pot, (Tr p 17,11 2-4). The officer acknowledged and testified that Beck denied

6
7

Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291
Id. @ 1689.
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knowledge of the can, the officer continued to question Beck, and the Beck then made
admissions/confessions, (Tr p 22, 11 7-25; p 25111-10), all without the benefit of Miranda
warnings, (Tr p 24, 11 5-7). Continued questioning after multiple and explicit denials is in
and of itself coercion- which is a step beyond the status of being unwarned.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the above cited reasons, Beck requests that this Court find that the evidence
found as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been suppressed, and the
admissions/confessions made as a result of the illegal search and seizure and
unwarned/coercive questioning by law enforcement should have been suppressed.
/
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